"The Global Crisis and the Implications for Developing Countries and the BRICs: Is the B Really Justified?" by Jan Kregel
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Public Policy Brief
No. 102, 2009
THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND THE BRICs
Is the B Really Justified?
jan kregelThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is an autonomous research organization. It is nonpartisan, open to the
examination of diverse points of view, and dedicated to public service.
The Institute is publishing this research with the conviction that it is a constructive and positive contribution to discussions and debates on
relevant policy issues. Neither the Institute’s Board of Governors nor its advisers necessarily endorse any proposal made by the authors.
The Institute believes in the potential for the study of economics to improve the human condition. Through scholarship and research it gen-
erates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States
and abroad.
The present research agenda includes such issues as financial instability, poverty, employment, gender, problems associated with the distribu-
tion of income and wealth, and international trade and competitiveness. In all its endeavors, the Institute places heavy emphasis on the val-
ues of personal freedom and justice.
Editor: W. Ray Towle
Text Editor: Barbara Ross
The Public Policy Brief Series is a publication of The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Blithewood, PO Box 5000, Annandale-on-
Hudson, NY 12504-5000. 
For information about the Levy Institute, call 845-758-7700 or 202-887-8464 (in Washington, D.C.), e-mail info@levy.org, or visit the Levy
Institute website at www.levy.org.
The Public Policy Brief Series is produced by the Bard Publications Office.
Copyright © 2009 by The Levy Economics Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information-retrieval system, without permis-





4 The Global Crisis and the Implications for Developing Countries and the BRICs
Jan Kregel
16 About the Author
ContentsThe term BRIC was first coined by Goldman Sachs and refers to
the fast-growing developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India,
and China—a class of middle-income emerging market economies
of relatively large size that are capable of self-sustained expan-
sion. Their combined economies could exceed the combined
economies of today’s richest countries by 2050. However, there
are concerns about how the current financial crisis will affect the
BRICs, and Goldman Sachs has questioned whether Brazil
should remain within this group. 
Senior Scholar Jan Kregel reviews the implications of the
global crisis for developing countries, based on the factors driv-
ing global trade. He concludes that there is unlikely to be a return
to the extremely positive conditions underlying the recent sharp
increase in growth and external accounts. The key for develop-
ing countries is to transform from export-led to domestic
demand-led growth. From this viewpoint, Brazil seems much
better placed than the other BRIC countries.
When Brazil had the highest return on equities of any coun-
try in the world and the real became a large positive-carry cur-
rency that translated into higher incomes and growth rates, these
features justified the Bin BRIC. Its strong national development
bank and greater financial stability (e.g., its derivatives market
is tightly regulated), combined with an increase in the minimum
wage, enabled Brazil to generate balanced growth during a global
recession. However, the (indirect) impact of exchange rate appre-
ciation and rising asset prices produced conditions that were typ-
ical of prior crises.
The factors driving global trade are all linked directly or
indirectly to changes in financial regulation and competition in
the United States. The evolution of the current financial crisis
stems from the U.S. subprime mortgage market and derivatives.
The outcome of the crisis will be a decline in returns due to ris-
ing capital requirements and a reduction in leverage. Thus, the
liquidity machine based on structured investment vehicles, mar-
gin positions, and default insurance will not be part of the new
financial system. Deleveraging and falling asset prices should not
have any bearing on the surety of BRIC banking systems, but the
high levels of liquidity have an impact on (higher) commodity
prices and the BRIC equity markets. 
Although Brazil’s positive performance and initial mem-
bership in the BRIC group appears to be linked to a financial
model and financial flows that are unlikely to be reestablished
because of structural changes (e.g., a reduction in U.S. house-
holds’ propensity to consume and the disappearance of leverage
from the global financial system), Brazil’s financial system has
been relatively untouched by the crisis. However, says Kregel,
Brazil should not return to a development strategy designed to
attract external capital and build on external demand (in spite of
temptations to do so in light of domestic demand recovery in
China). Rather, the most obvious path is the transition to growth
based on domestic income growth and consumption through
diversification of markets and production. This path is particu-
larly important in economies where large peasant or agricultural
populations and associated income inequalities remain. 
Kregel notes that Brazil already has a transition policy in
place, along with programs that seek to augment the rate of
domestic demand and growth through government-sponsored
infrastructure investment projects. He suggests that these pro-
grams should be implemented in conjunction with a national
job guarantee program in order to mitigate the increase in unem-
ployment, which has been one of the major repercussions of the
crisis. In addition, the domestic financial market should trans-
form from a structure providing government financing to one
providing long-term capital for domestic productive investment. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
August 2009
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The Global Crisis and the 
Implications for Developing 
Countries and the BRICs
The new millennium has been characterized by exceptionally
positive performance for most developing economies. Even
excepting India and China, performance in Latin America and
Africa has been higher and more sustained than in any period
since the postwar “golden age” of late-import substitution (Figure
1).Growth rates continued to increase on a sustained basis after
the turn of the century and this was accompanied by a general
reduction in consumer prices (Figure 2). But even more impor-
tant was the elimination of the external constraint on growth in
developing countries, as virtually all of the non-Asia developing
world managed to generate current account surpluses (Figure 3).
It was these surpluses that fed the increase in foreign exchange
reserves that had already been observed in the recovering Asian
economies,particularly China. Thus, the answer to the question
of how the current financial crisis will affect developing countries
in general and the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—in
particular depends on the source of this sharp increase in growth
and external accounts. One possibility is that structural adjust-
ment policies brought about these improvements, in which case
these countries should be relatively immune to the current tur-
moil in financial markets. 
An alternative is to look at the counterpart of these improve-
ments—the change in policy that was introduced in the United
States in the 1990s, which led to the massive increase in global
trade and imbalances. In simple terms, the United States forced
the rest of the world to convert to policies of export-led growth.
There were four basic factors driving global trade during this
period, virtually all of them linked to changes in financial regu-
lation and competition in the United States. 
The first was the influence of private equity firms in driving
U.S. firms to increase rates of return—many firms were forced to
outsource production (either in defense or as a result of private
equity investor takeovers) and take advantage of lower foreign
labor costs linked to the dominance of U.S. technology. This tended
to place downward pressure on U.S. wages and employment.
The second factor was the increase in household borrowing
as a means of preserving consumption in the presence of falling
real wages. This process was in place long before the advent of
subprime mortgages but accelerated with the upward impetus
on house prices and households’ ready access to home equity
(the home as ATM). This response created rising demand for the
exports of developing countries that were often produced by U.S.
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The third factor was the creation of the so-called “shadow
banking system.” In reality, the force at work was the increase in
leverage that allowed large increases in international capital flows,
leading to current account surpluses that supported exchangerates
and increased foreign reserves in many developing countries. 
And the fourth factor was the emergence of “real return”
investment (return above inflation) that turned primary com-
moditiesinto an asset class. Commodity investment funds helped
to accelerate the increase in commodity prices that had com-
menced with the rapid growth of some developing countries and
government support for biofuels (in response to environmental
concerns and climbing petroleum prices). These commodity
price increases produced similar increases in the terms of trade,
which also reinforced rising incomes in developing countries.
It seems clear that all of these factors were driven by the evo-
lution of financial conditions in the United States. Thus, the evo-
lution of developing countries in the new millennium can be
characterized as a “bubble.” The counterpart of the financial bub-
ble in the U.S. economy was the extremely beneficial conditions
in developing countries and in particular, Latin American emerg-
ing markets. If the crisis leads to a permanent elimination of
recent levels of leverage in the U.S. system, and if households
move to pay down debt and increase savings, and if there is a
return of manufacturing employment to the United States, then
it would be prudent to conclude that we cannot foresee a return
to the extremely positive conditions recently experienced by
developing countries.  
It has become commonplace, however, to distinguish cer-
tain emerging market economies from developing economies in
general, and to suggest that their behavior will be quite differ-
ent. The term “emerging market economy” was created by sell-
side investment firms and relates to a country’s emergence from
default and becoming once again a destination of potential invest-
ment.Its origin was in the rapid growth and industrialization of
Latin American countries after the 1980s debt crisis, which was
linked to the Brady bond solution; that is, finding alternative
lenders to bail out the banks’ syndicated loans. These lenders
were institutional and other portfolio investors, and the open-
ing of financial markets accompanied by the privatization of
state assets were designed to provide alternative assets for these
investors to buy, while Washington Consensus policies provided
expectations of above market returns. We now know that the
result of this combination produced price stability and slower
growth, as well as periodic financial crises that cancelled out
most of that growth. The success of emerging markets has been
limited to the financial institutions of developed countries that
intermediated this process.  
It has also become commonplace to distinguish a small
number of emerging market economies—the BRICs. But this
category is also an invention of developed-country financial
institutions such as Goldman Sachs (O’Neill 2001) seeking sim-
ilar intermediation profits. Initially, the BRICs were a class of
middle-income emerging market economies of relatively large
size and capable of more or less self-sustained expansion. At their
baptism, it was predicted that they would comprise more than 10
percent of global output by 2010, but by the end of 2007, they
already accounted for 15 percent of the global economy. The real
interest in these countries was not income growth or even per
capita income growth, but the performance of their financial
markets; particularly, their equity markets. Between January 2001
and October 2007, equity markets rose 314 percent in Brazil, 1648
percent in Russia, 405 percent in India, and 902 percent in China
(based on the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index) (Figure 4).
The attempt to include Mexico in this group seems to have
been due more to the exigencies of political discussion of gover-
nance reform at the fall 2006 Bank-Fund meetings in Singapore
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The Impact of the Crisis
It is important to note that the original BRIC grouping was not
based on economic similarities. Indeed, the four original coun-
triescouldnotbemoredifferent.Itistempting,however,todivide
the countries into two subgroups: India and China are peasant
economieswithrelativelyclosed,state-controlled,regulatedcap-
ital markets; Brazil and Russia are primarily natural resource–
based economies that are open to foreign trade and financial
flows, and have a mixture of state and private sector control of
capital markets. The first subgroup has guided its exchange rate
(more in China than in India), while the second subgroup has
more flexible exchange rates. India and China practice develop-
ment strategies based on domestic industrialization (manufac-
turing and services) for export, while Brazil and Russia follow
exportstrategiesindirectingproductivestructuresthatareguided
by international comparative advantage. While this latter sub-
grouphasexperiencedexchangerateandfinancialcrisesthatwere
usually accompanied by high inflation,the former subgroup has
not. Moreover, the latter has borrowed from the International
MonetaryFund(IMF)andemployedstructuraladjustmentpoli-
cies to access IMF funding,while the former has not.
All of the governments in the BRIC countries play a role in
guiding the economy and directing the capital markets.There is
a basic difference, however, with respect to the role played by
BNDES,the Brazilian development bank.This institution is not
only formally independent of the private capital market, but it
largelysupplantsthismarket.Itisalsoimportanttonotethatall
countries over the last two decades have benefited directly or
indirectly from the expansion of the U.S. economy at rates that
were above what was once considered sustainable and compati-
ble with price stability, and from international imbalances that
were above what was once considered sustainable or supported
financially with a stable dollar exchange rate.
It is also important to note that global statistical compar-
isons are skewed by the weight of China and, to a lesser extent,
India. If China and India had matched Brazil’s average growth
rateoverthelast10years,thecatching-upforecastswouldnotbe
so impressive. Indeed, Goldman Sachs has recently raised the
question,“Can we justify the B in BRIC?”
Since the initial impact of the current crisis was felt in the
financialsector(inparticular,thefreezingof domesticandglobal
liquidity in industrialized countries), followed by deleveraging
and a sharp decline in lending to private productive enterprises
andconsumers,theanalysisshouldstartwiththeBRIC financial
good by recent standards (2.6 percent in the 2001–07 period and
3.9percentinthe2004–07periodcomparedto3.4and4.6percent
for Brazil).The political as distinct from the economic reason for




Indeed,Mexico was included in Goldman Sachs’s so-called N-11
group—the“next 11”emerging economies that were expected to
catch up with the G-7 but not the BRICs.2
Nonetheless,theimportantpointisthatallof thesenumer-
ical arrangements were formed on the wave of the exceptionally
rapid recovery from the Asian financial crisis and from the dot-
com equity market collapse in developed countries. In particular,
LatinAmerica did not experience any major financial crisis in the
newmillennium.Admittedly,theoriginalformulationswerebased
onadreamthatcouldturnintoanightmareasaresultoftheglobal
financial crisis and the threat of a global depression. This cir-
cumstance raises three questions:How will the BRICs and other
emerging market countries be affected by the crisis? What role






































Figure 4 U.S.and BRIC Equity Markets,2001–08
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systems. And since the liquidity crisis and the failure of financial
institutions led to a U.S. recession that spread to other industrial-
ized economies (e.g., the European Union and Japan), the second
issue is how the economic slowdown in industrialized countries
impacts global trade, particularly with regard to emerging mar-
ket countries and the BRICs. The slowdown’s effects highlight
the fact that exceptional growth in these countries has been due
to the influence of globalization on trade and financial condi-
tions. The performance of the BRICs must be considered in a
global context, as none of these countries seem to possess the
internal engine of growth required to fulfill their “dream” growth
scenarios. 
The evolution of the current financial crisis has been two-
dimensional. The first dimension was the relatively contained
difficulties in the U.S. subprime mortgage market that spread to
the entire U.S. financial system and then to Europe. It has called
into question the very operation of the spread-trading model,
which is based on the high degree of leverage of the financial
institutions in industrialized countries. In reality, the difficulty
was not so much the extension of the model to low-income bor-
rowers as it was the need for high volumes in order to profit from
extremely small rate spreads. This could only be achieved through
increased reliance on short-term funding and high levels of lever-
age, and was especially evident in the shadow banking system.
Financial institutions borrowed short to invest in longer-term
assets, without the benefit of either FDIC insurance (for the
lenders) or access to the Fed’s discount window for lender-of-
last-resort funding. These institutions have become insolvent,
and they, along with the leverage they provided, will not return
in the immediate future. 
The second dimension was derivatives, which allowed mar-
ket exposure against negligible margin payments and were
another source of leverage. Derivatives also implied substantial
credit exposure in the form of counterparty risk, which was not
recognized until the crisis broke out. In future, these instruments
will be under much tighter restrictions and margin requirements
as well. Thus, the two basic outcomes of the financial crisis will
be the decline in  returns due to rising capital requirements, and
the reduction in leverage. This process of deleveraging will be
accompanied by a reduction in asset prices and deflation of the
asset “bubble,” and forms the basis for the current stalemate in
policy responses and in the lending behavior of banks. If the liq-
uidity crisis was the result of reducing the leverage that caused the
rise in asset prices, then it is possible to conclude that the recent
decline in asset prices is due not to market valuations but to the
lack of liquidity that has prevented efficient markets from pro-
viding appropriate pricing. Solving the liquidity crisis would
allow prices to return to “normal,” and strengthening bank bal-
ance sheets would allow banks to lend once again. 
This viewpoint is expressed by Paul Reisz (2009), a product
manager at PIMCO, one of the largest fixed-income asset man-
agers in the United States: 
The deleveraging of the shadow banking system has set
“pawn shop” prices on many otherwise high-quality
securities. This is the result of the liquidity premium
that is being demanded by buyers who have the avail-
able balance sheet to take on even the high-quality secu-
rities that deleveraging investors are forced to sell. 
The prices in the market are not indicative of the long-
term value of many of the high-quality securities in the
market. We could call this the risk premium for a short-
age of balance sheet in the market, or a liquidity premium.
. . . However, since the Treasury, the Fed and the FDIC
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) do not want
securities to trade at the pawn shop bid level, they have
developed programs intended to support prices, such as
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. . . .
The government is substituting its own balance sheet
for the missing balance sheet on Wall Street, with the
aim of supporting prices on ABS and incrementally
nudging the prices up closer to their intrinsic value.
Alternatively, if the assessment is that the liquidity currently
provided by government programs will never be supplanted by
private sector funding, then deleveraging will result in a perma-
nent decline in asset prices and bank profitability. The problem
with asset prices is not that the lack of liquidity is generating
pawnshop prices but simply that leverage is generating unrealis-
tically high (carnival) prices, where losses have to be borne by
either the government or private financial institutions. In either
case, the liquidity machine based on structured investment vehi-
cles, margin positions, and default insurance will not be part of
the new financial system.
There are thus two basic impacts on the BRICs’ financial sys-
tems. The first concerns intrinsic value prices. Although financialPublic Policy Brief, No. 102 8
total return on equities of any country in the world. In addition
to rising petroleum prices, the shift to biofuels, and higher food
and commodity prices, there were massive capital inflows that
Brazil’s central bank was unwilling to offset, producing a very
rapid rise in the effective exchange rate. At the same time, mon-
etary tightening, in response to rising prices, led to extremely
high interest rate differentials. The Brazilian real became a large
positive-carry currency, producing substantial short-term, specu-
lative, interest-arbitrage inflows3 (Figure 5). The combination of
these factors produced a rising current account surplus (Figure 6)
in the presence of realexchange rate appreciation (Figure 7), ris-
institutions had holdings of U.S.-issued asset-backed securities,
these were not substantial (Chinese and Indian banks reported
losses of less than a billion dollars). Moreover, Russia and Brazil
do not appear to have made significant investments in the types
of securities that will be affected by price deflation. Thus, delever-
aging and falling asset prices should not have any bearing on the
surety of BRIC banking systems.
However, the high levels of liquidity have had an additional
consequence for prices. In particular, it is now generally accepted
that the run-up in petroleum and primary commodity prices
since 2004 has been driven by proprietary speculative trading by
financial institutions in developed countries, as well as by sales of
“real return” investments to institutional investors as hedges
against inflation. Commodity investments became an asset class
and entered investment funds, but given the difficulty of stor-
age, positions were determined by purchasing futures contracts.
It is not surprising that, once deleveraging started, prices in these
markets quickly collapsed. 
High liquidity levels, coupled with the Federal Reserve’s deci-
sion to push interest rates to historic lows (in response to the col-
lapse of the dot-com equity bubble and the political turmoil that
followed 9/11), led to a secondary impact, as capital flowed to
BRIC equity markets—realizing Goldman Sachs’s goal to generate
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Figure 5 Foreign Direct Investment and Company Equity
in Brazil, 1999–2009 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
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Figure 6 Brazil’s Current Account Balance, 1996–2009 
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: Banco Central do BrasilThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
ing asset prices (Figure 8), and improvements in the terms of
trade (Figure 9) that translated into higher incomes and growth
rates. It was enough to justify the B in BRIC.
However, for the rising number of Brazilian export firms, the
appreciation of the real was a mixed blessing. Many sought to
temper the blow to their external competitiveness and profitabil-
ity by hedging against a further decline in the dollar. In addition,
many banks that had profited from the 1999 exchange rate crisis
by using derivatives to speculate against the real now reversed
their strategy, in the belief that the trend in capital flows and
external balances would continue, leading to sustained strength in
the currency.4Of course, when the exchange rate started its rapid
decline in early 2008, many corporate buyers of these contracts
could not make payment. It is estimated that outstanding corpo-
rate exposure to these derivatives was R$49–74 billion.
Heavy losses on currency derivatives have been reported by
Sadia, a food processor; Votorantim, an industrial conglomer-
ate; and Aracruz, one of the world’s biggest pulp and paper man-
ufacturers, among other firms. The possibility that hundreds of
companies may wish to renegotiate their exposure to derivatives
with issuing banks prompted the Brazilian legislature, in October
2008, to enact MP443, a provisional measure that allowed gov-
ernment-controlled Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal
(CEF)to acquire the capital of private financial institutions. The
measure also created an investment bank under CEF to acquire
capital in sectors other than the financial sector (e.g., the con-
struction industry). It also authorized Brazil’s central bank to
put in place currency swap lines with other international central
banks and increase its potential to provide market liquidity
(Figure 10). In February 2009, Banco Itaú merged with Unibanco
in order to protect itself from impending losses on derivatives
contracts written to corporate clients. Moreover, Votorantim
acquired Aracruz (thus meeting the latter’s derivative losses),
while Banco do Brasil acquired a 50 percent stake in Banco
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Figure 10 Brazil’s Domestic Banking Credit with Foreign 
Funding, 2008–09 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Domestic Banking Credit with Foreign Funding
Source: Banco Central do BrasilPublic Policy Brief, No. 102 10
The interest rate policies of Brazil’s central bank and their
impact on government financing (even in surplus conditions)
meant that Brazilian banks had no need to increase risks for
higher yields (Figure 11). Higher returns at minimal risk were
available through government securities, so there was little incen-
tive to move into mortgage-backed securities issued abroad. As
a result, the return on equity for Brazilian banks during the sub-
prime crisis has been roughly double that for the United States,
and substantially higher than that for other BRIC countries
(Table 1). In addition, these dollar-denominated structured
investments were increasingly risky given the trajectory of the
Votorantim and a roughly 75 percent share of Banco Nossa
Caixa. It is estimated that the eight largest Brazilian banks will
take losses in excess of $5 billion as a result of their own posi-
tions or counterparty failures.
These Brazilian banks did not engage in the same kinds of
originate-and-distribute activities as U.S. banks, nor did they
invest in these kinds of assets to gain higher yields. However, the
(indirect) impact of exchange rate appreciation and rising asset
prices produced conditions that were typical of prior crises.
Interest rate differentials made short dollar positions attractive.
These positions were pursued largely through derivative posi-
tions for the banks’ own books and to accommodate corporate
clients—activities that were not sufficient to threaten the stabil-
ity of the financial system because a number of preventive merger
actions were undertaken to ensure a measure of stability. 
One reason for Brazil’s greater financial stability is undoubt-
edly the rigorous regulation of its derivatives market. However,
the argument that this was primarily due to the prudent man-
agement of bank balance sheets seems to overstate the case. The
main incentive for the development of securitized lending and
the sale of securitized asset-backed securities in the industrialized
financial markets was the low profitability of commercial bank-
ing relative to investment banking and the search for yield by
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Figure 11 Interest Rate and Swap Reference Rates, Brazil, 
2008−09 (in percent)
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Foreign-owned Assets in the United States, Excluding Financial 
Derivatives (increase/financial inflow (+))
U.S.-owned Assets Abroad, Excluding Financial Derivatives 
(increase/financial outflow (−))  
Figure 12 Reversal of Financial Globalization? Repatriation 
of U.S. Capital (4-quarter moving average), 2000–08 

























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: Bureau of Economc Analysis
2003 2004  2005 2006 2007 2008  Latest
Brazil 21.1  22.1  29.5  27.3  28.9  20.4  October
Russia 17.8 20.3 24.2 26.3 22.7 12.1 September
China — 13.7 15.1 14.8 19.9  — June
India 18.8  20.8  13.3  12.7  13.2  12.5  March
Japan –2.7 4.1  11.3 8.5 6.1 3.0  September
United States 15.0  13.2  12.7  12.3  7.8  3.3  September
Table 1 Bank Return on Equity (in percent)
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, Table 27The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
exchange rate. Nonetheless, banks and corporations saw little dif-
ficulty in running exchange rate risks through derivatives con-
tracts and (inappropriate) hedging vehicles.
The creation of global liquidity was more important than
the impact of U.S. financial expansion on asset prices. The
improvement in Brazil’s exchange rate was due largely to sharply
increased foreign direct investment flows that were reinforced by
short-term carry trade speculation and the attractiveness of
Brazilian equities. As noted above, most of the (fatal) attraction
for capital inflows was driven by the leverage created in the U.S.
financial system. Even the (positive) effect on commodity prices,
presumed to be a result of rising consumption in China, was in
the end financed by consumer borrowing related to the U.S.
housing boom. 
The reversal of this process through deleveraging not only
let all the air out of the asset and commodity bubbles but also
required U.S. financial institutions to repatriate capital to cover
losses and close positions (Figures 12–16). European banks that
had used cheap dollar borrowing to finance high-yield mort-
gage-backed assets faced a similar problem. These actions pro-
duced a dollar scarcity that brought about a capital reversal and
global liquidity shock similar to that in the 1990s, along with a
sharp reversal of emerging-market currency appreciation. Global
and domestic trade declined sharply (Figures 17 and 18). Falling
demand for imports worldwide, coupled with the disappearance
of trade finance, spread the collapse of U.S. and European
demand throughout the developing world. Thus, virtually all of
Brazil’s positive performance in meeting membership in the
BRICs appears to be linked to a financial model and financial
flows that are unlikely to be reestablished. As outlined earlier,
increased leverage that was considered normal in the operation
of the financial institutions of developed countries will not
return, as leverage generated by derivatives will be held in check













Figure 13 External Financing of Emerging Market 

























Source: The Institute of International Finance, Inc.
Figure 14 BIS Reporting Countries: Cross-border Assets as 
a Proportion of Total Assets, 2003–08 (annual change in 


















































Figure 15 Emerging Market Net Private Capital Flows,
1980–2010 (in percent of GDP)
Source: IMF, WEO Database, April 2009Public Policy Brief, No. 102 12
The second response raises the question of who will provide
the capital and demand for a growth rate above 3 percent when
conditions cannot return to normal because of structural changes;
that is, a reduction in U.S. households’ propensity to consume
and the disappearance of leverage from the global financial sys-
tem. There is a general similarity across BRIC economies, since
they all depend on expanding demand by increasing global trade
and maintaining global imbalances financed by global financial
flows. In this context, China retains greater autonomy when com-
lower asset prices but also lower global demand for emerging
market exports and reduced financial flows to emerging mar-
kets, including the BRICs. 
The Response to the Crisis
Of the two possible responses to the crisis, one involves an
attempt to restore the status quo, while the other recognizes that
the status quo is not an option in light of the likely structural
changes in developed financial markets. The former response
requires little more than a survival policy—waiting until prices
return to intrinsic values so that the U.S. government can with-
draw its balance sheet support and return management of the
financial system to market forces. Brazil and the other BRIC
countries seem well placed to respond in this way, given that their
financial systems have been relatively untouched by the crisis and
have maintained high levels of foreign reserves to cover tempo-
rary external deficits caused by the decline in global trade.
Indeed, mergers may have strengthened the ability of the Brazilian
banking system to mitigate the crisis. Moreover, reserves of
approximately $200 billion, plus Federal Reserve swap lines and
IMF support, are certainly sufficient to allow recovery within six
to 12 months. This timeframe fits the scenario of those who are












































Figure 16 Emerging Market Hedge Funds: Estimated Assets 
and Net Asset Flows, 2002–08 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009
Figure 17 World Exports and Imports, 2005–09 
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Source: Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, BrazilThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
pared to other BRIC countries (given its size and the permanence
of its foreign exchange reserve position). Indeed, if China decides
to offset the decline in global demand by increasing its domestic
expansion, and to follow through with its policy to diversify its
reserve holdings (by increasing its stockpiles of natural
resources), it may become the source of Brazil’s external demand.
There are signs of domestic demand recovery in China, which
will drive the demand for primary materials, and there is clear
evidence that China’s central bank has chosen to diversify its
reserve holdings by expanding into natural resources. However, it
is unlikely that China can provide internal stimulus sufficient to
replace U.S. demand on a global scale. Moreover, its reserve diver-
sification process will impact commodity prices and stimulate
inflation, which might influence central banks to reduce their
stimulus packages and increase interest rates before the global
economy begins to recover. 
Because of China’s possible influence on the global econ-
omy, it is tempting to return to the Brazilian development strat-
egy of the 1990s and early this century, when policies were
designed to attract external capital and build on external
demand. However, if there were a change in the shape of global-
ization and the structure of global demand, policy based on this
strategy would be a mistake. This temptation is also reinforced by
the return of external capital inflows, but these inflows have been
driven primarily by the U.S. investment banking sector’s expec-
tation of a return to previous growth rates and the resumption
of the carry trade in emerging markets: 
Last month, the carry trade roared back, with ABN
Amro’s index gaining 4.6 percent, its best month since
September 2003. As of today, the Dollar Index had
fallen about 5.4 percent from its March 4 high. 
An equally weighted basket of currencies consisting of
Turkish lira, Brazilian real, Hungarian forint, Indonesian
rupiah, South African rand and Australian and New
Zealand dollars—bought with yen, dollars and euros—
earned an annualized 196 percent from March 2 to April
10. That trade produced a 41 percent annualized loss from
September, when Lehman collapsed, through February.
Benchmark rates in those seven economies range from
3 percent in New Zealand and Australia to Brazil’s 11.25
percent. Comparable rates in the euro region, Japan and
the U.S. are 1.25, 0.1 and between zero and 0.25 per-
cent, respectively. (Cutler and Nielsen 2009)
The experience of the last decade—which includes Chinese
demand for primary commodities, external investment, and the
resumption of the carry trade—implies that development strat-
egy should be left to the vagaries of foreign governments and
international monetary conditions. Abandoning this strategy
would substantiate an increasingly voiced opinion that it is not
possible for an economy to develop on the basis of external sav-
ings.5 Rather, all development depends on the mobilization of
domestic resources and the direction of domestic policy to fully
utilize domestic resources.
Thus, the most obvious path (and the continuing dilemma
facing countries that have adopted a development strategy based
on external demand) is the transition to growth based on domes-
tic income growth and consumption through diversification of
markets and production. Indeed, the shift from an economy
dependent on exports to an economy led by domestic demand
has been a highly elusive goal. Japan has never been able to
achieve this goal, and has suffered from stagnant growth since
1999. This option does not apply to Brazil, since its per capita
income level and (higher) population growth do not compare
with Japan’s. The same situation applies to the other BRIC
economies. Thus, the key is to continue the transformation from
export-led to domestic demand–led growth in economies where
large peasant or agricultural populations and associated income
inequalities remain. 
From this point of view, Brazil seems much better placed
than the other BRIC countries. Indeed, Brazil already has a tran-
sition policy that it is ready to implement, one based on the
Plano Plurianual de Ação (PPA; 2004–07), the Agenda Nacional
de Desenvolvimento (AND; 2006), and the Programa de
Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC; 2007).  These programs sought
to augment the rate of domestic demand and growth through
government-supported infrastructure investment projects (includ-
ing housing and roads) that were often aimed to improve the
plight of the disadvantaged members of Brazilian society. 
In a country known for corruption and an inefficient
bureaucracy, one must question whether these programs suffi-
ciently address the root causes of the social problems that they
were intended to tackle. It also remains to be seen whether these
programs will generate lasting social change beyond President
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and development, and its ability to provide a balanced expan-
sion based on industry, natural resources, and agriculture. The
country also has a banking system that could develop a capital
market complementary to BNDES that could concentrate on
supporting growth in new technologies. If Brazil can wean itself
from dependence on external demand and external finance by
implementing a sustainable transition to domestic demand-led
growth, it will remain solidly within the BRIC camp. While Brazil
is especially well placed to implement a viable transition strategy,
there will be renewed pressure on primary commodity supplies,
energy prices, and environmental issues if all emerging market
developing countries make the same transition successfully.
Thus, domestic demand-led policies must also pay attention to
food and environmental issues that have a disproportionate
effect on price stability and incomes in the poorest countries.
Notes
1.  “This weekend, Mexico will be included in the BRIMCS
Group, comprising the six most important emerging nations
in the global economy that will complement the decisions of
the Group of Seven (G 7) in which the United States, Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and Canada partic-
ipate. The six BRIMCS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico,
China and South Africa) together account for nearly a third
of global production and nearly 50 percent of the world´s
inhabitants. . . . The extended talks will not only concern the
way multilateral trade talks can be re  established after the fail-
ure of the Doha talks but also involve multilateral coordination
mechanisms for reducing global imbalances, supporting the
medium/term reform of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and restructuring the governing bodies of both the IMF
and the World Bank (WB)” (http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/en/
goodnews/?contenido=27161&pagina=2).
2.  The developing-country political grouping with a poten-
tially greater impact on the global economy is the trilateral
IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), which aims to increase
South-South cooperation. See www.ibsa-trilateral.org.
3.  According to Cutler and Nielsen (2009), this position has
been maintained through the crisis: “Borrowing U.S. dollars
at the three-month London interbank offered rate of 1.13
percent and using the proceeds to buy real and earn Brazil’s
three-month deposit rate of 10.51 percent rate would net an
annualized 9.38 percent, as long as both currencies remain
PPA was based on generating domestic demand with government
support by reducing income inequality and creating demand for
products produced by domestic industry. It wasprecisely the kind
of program required to shift dependence from foreign to domes-
tic demand without creating domestic inflation or external
imbalances. The presence of a strong national development bank
to finance the supply side of the program, combinedwith the abil-
ity to influence incomes through an increase in the minimum
wage, enabled the program to generate balanced growth during
a global recession.
The proposed increase in the renda basica(minimum income)
is, however, an inefficient tool for building domestic demand and
reducing inequality because it only affects those who are employed.
One of the major repercussions of the crisis is the increase 
in unemployment, compounding the long-term deficiency of
employment in Brazil. Thus, it would be necessary to implement
the PPA in combination with a well-designed government pro-
gram of employment or job guarantees. India has already taken
steps in this direction with its National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (2005), while Brazil has proposed the Programa
Cidade Cidadã for large urban areas.6The Brazilian program
might also reduce the pressure on land redistribution, as the
majority of those making up the Sem Terra (“without land”)
group are reportedly urban industrial workers who have given
up looking for employment and are seeking farmland from
which to make a subsistence living. 
At the outset, PPA, AND, and PAC were never fully imple-
mented because of external considerations affecting government
finances and the need to gain investment-grade status to deal
with the problem of debt sustainability. Indeed, economic policy
was designed to allow Brazil to benefit from U.S. demand-led
and Chinese-financed growth. If that global growth structure is
unlikely to be restored, then domestic policy should be made
compatible with this new global structure. The most important
attraction would be the ability to grow domestically without
external demand and foreign financing, and within the bounds of
international trade agreements. This would be possible by imple-
menting a PPA in combination with a national job-guarantee
program. In addition, it would be necessary to transform the
domestic financial market from an institution that invests in gov-
ernment securitiesto one providing long-term capital for domes-
tic productive investment. 
From this perspective, Brazil has an advantage over the other
BRIC countries given its existing structures supporting researchThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
stable.” The same is true for many of the BRICs and other
developing countries: “Goldman Sachs recommended on
April 3 that investors use euros, dollars, and yen to buy
Mexican pesos, real, rupiah, rand and rubles from Russia,
where the benchmark central bank rate is 13 percent. Using
equally weighted baskets, that carry trade would have returned
8 percent in the past month, for an annualized 165 percent,
data compiled by Bloomberg show. ‘Group-of-three cur-
rencies are expensive while emerging-market currencies are
cheap,’ said Themos Fiotakis, a London-based Goldman Sachs
analyst.‘The downside risks have declined significantly for
emerging-market currencies. Even if these currencies remain
flat, the carry is still attractive.’”
4.  Instead of using futures contracts to speculate on a depreci-
ation after the 1998 election, banks took positions to profit
from the continued strength of the currency based on fore-
casts that predicted a return to parity with the dollar and by
writing out-of-the-money call options on the dollar, writing
target-forward contracts for corporate clients, and arrang-
ing low-interest-rate dollar lending. 
5.  See Bresser-Pereira (2009) and Kregel (2008). This position
simply reflects the tradition of development pioneers such as
Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Ragnar Nurkse, Gunnar Myrdal,
and others. It is also present in the Trade and Development
Reports issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development in the 1990s.
6.  In this respect, an increase in the supply of jobs might
reduce the pressure in the countryside, as it is reported that
a large proportion of the supporters of the Sem Terra move-
ment are unemployed urban workers who see agricultural
employment as the only possibility to attain a decent living.
See www.desmpregozero.org.br. For more general informa-
tion on job guarantee programs employed in other economies,
see www.economistsforfullemployment.org.
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